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I. INTRODUCTION
The international community condemns serious human rights
violations such as genocide, torture, enforced disappearances, and
summary executions. When these crimes are committed in a
particular State, the authorities have the international obligation to
seek the truth and to prosecute and punish any person who is found
responsible. States cannot enact amnesty laws nor grant pardons to
prevent human rigths offenders from facing justice.
But, what happens when tens of thousands of crimes are
committed, for instance, in the context of armed conflicts or
tyrannical regimes? In these scenarios, States face some structural
obstacles that may retard or impede the investigation and prosecution
of human rights abuses. First, because justice systems have limited
resources, they cannot handle the extraordinary amount of cases and
get overwhelmed by backlogs. Second, because these types of crimes
are particularly difficult to investigate and to prove, prosecutors may
not be able to collect sufficient evidence to convict all of the
offenders.
Some States allow prosecutorial discretion as a tool to deal with
similar difficulties in the investigation and prosecution of domestic
crimes. Granting prosecutors discretion to select cases allows them to
reduce workloads and to allocate resources more rationally.
Moreover, prosecutors can obtain valuable evidence by offering
immunity to certain offenders who cooperate with the prosecution of
other criminals. Yet, it is not clear whether international law
authorizes prosecutorial discretion in the investigation and
prosecution of serious human rights violations.
This article examines the recent process of truth and justice in
Argentina, and describes the practical difficulties that a State faces
during the investigation and prosecution of massive human rights
abuses. It explains why prosecutorial discretion is an useful tool to
overcome these obstacles, and it addresses the question of whether
international law authorizes this practice. This article supports the
proposition that the international obligation to investigate and
prosecute serious human rights violations should not be construed as
prohibiting the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. But, at the same
time, it argues that international law imposes substantive and
procedural limits on prosecutors’ discretionary powers. In short,
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international law only allows States to exercise some limited
prosecutorial discretion to advance the discharge of the duty to
investigate and prosecute, provided that it is regulated by law and
that victims are afforded a judicial recource to control its application
in each case.
This article is divided into five sections. Section II describes the
sources, scope, and rationales of the international obligation to
investigate and prosecute serious human rights violations. Section III
explains the structural obstacles domestic justice systems experience
when trying to discharge that obligation. It describes the current
process of accountability in Argentina and shows the problems that
arise when a domestic system tries to investigate and prosecute mass
crimes. It further explains why prosecutorial discretion is a necessary
tool to overcome those structural obstacles. Section IV explains how
international law regulates the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in
these contexts. Finally, Section V draws the conclusion that the
prohibition of prosecutorial discretion would be detrimental to the
goals of the obligation to investigate and prosecute, and that a better
approach is to interpret international law as regulating its exercise.

II. THE OBLIGATION TO INVESTIGATE AND
PROSECUTE SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS
The duty to prosecute grave offences against human rights
originally developed in the area of international humanitarian law, in
connection with international conflicts. 1 After the horrors of World
War II, the Nuremberg Trials introduced the concept of crimes
against humanity, which is based on the principle that fundamental
rights are inherent to the human condition, but still requires a nexus
with war crimes. 2 However, the commission of massive abuses in
1. See ANJA SEIBERT-FOHR, PROSECUTING SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS 2 (2009) (asserting that as early as the 1900s, the Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the
Field of 1906 and the Tenth Hague Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime
Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of 1907 incorporated
provisions punishing individual acts of ill treatment of the wounded and sick).
2. See id. at 3; Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to
Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2560
(1991) [hereinafter Orentlicher, Settling Accounts].
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contexts of local conflicts and tyrannical regimes consolidated the
idea that human rights violations are a matter of global concern
regardless of whether they are the result of international conflicts. 3
This consensus led to the increasing development of international
criminal law as a mechanism to prevent abuses and protect
fundamental rights. International crimes such as genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and torture are now considered jus
cogens. 4 That means that, among other obligations, 5 States have the
mandatory duty to prosecute or extradite perpetrators of these crimes
(aut dedere aut judicare), and those found guilty must be punished. 6
The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) 7 has
codified these customary norms and has established an enforcing
mechanism complementary to domestic prosecution. According to
this scheme, States retain primary responsibility in the prosecution
and punishment of international crimes. 8
In addition, several human rights treaties expressly require States
to investigate and prosecute genocide, torture, enforced
disappearances, and other offences. 9 The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 10 adopted in
1948, was the first treaty after World War II to explicitly call for
punishment of a practice considered to be the most heinous crime

3. See SEIBERT-FOHR, supra note 1, at 3.
4. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The
Need for Accountability, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 17 (1996).
5. States also have the obligation to provide legal assistance, to eliminate
statute of limitations, and to eliminate immunities including of heads of States.
6. See Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 17.
7. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (“A sentence of imprisonment shall be
served in a State designated by the Court from a list of States which have indicated
to the Court their willingness to accept sentenced persons.”).
8. See id. (“It is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction
over those responsible for international crimes”).
9. See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances, Dec. 20, 2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Enforced
Disappearances Convention]; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Torture Convention]; Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S.
277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
10. Genocide Convention, supra note 9.
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against humankind. 11 Under article I, the Contracting Parties
“undertake to prevent and to punish” genocide. 12 Domestic courts of
the State party in whose territory the acts of genocide have been
committed have primary jurisdiction. 13 Article 12 of The Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment 14 also requires criminal prosecution of acts of
torture, 15 which must be criminalized by States under their domestic
law, as required by article 4.1. Finally, the International Convention
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances 16
establishes a detailed catalog of criminal obligations. According to
articles 4 and 7, States must criminalize enforced disappearances
under their domestic criminal law, establishing appropriate penalties
in proportion to the “extreme seriousness” of the crime. 17 Pursuant to
this convention, all acts of enforced disappearance must be
investigated and those responsible held liable. As these universal
treaties show, there has been a tendency in international law to
increasingly ask State Parties to prosecute and punish some
particularly serious human rights offences. 18
In conformity with this tendency, the international and regional
human rights bodies have recognized the obligation to investigate
and prosecute serious human rights violations, even in absence of
specific treaty provisions requiring such response. The Human
Rights Committee, which supervises compliance with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 has held
repeatedly that State parties must bring perpetrators of human rights
violations to justice. 20 The Committee has explicitly required
11. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2563-65.
12. Genocide Convention, supra note 9, art. 1; see also id. art. 2 (“Contracting
Parties agree to prevent and punish acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group . . . .”).
13. For those cases in which the States’ parties failed in the investigation and
prosecution of the crime of genocide, the Convention provided for the creation of
an international penal tribunal.
14. Torture Convention, supra note 9.
15. See id. art. 12; see also id. art. 1 (providing a detailed definition of what
actions are considered “torture”).
16. Enforced Disappearances Convention, supra note 9.
17. See id. arts. 4, 7; see also id. art. 2 (defining “enforced disappearance”).
18. See SEIBERT-FOHR, supra note 1, at 183.
19. ICCPR, supra note 9.
20. See, e.g., Barbato v. Uruguay, Communication No. 84/1981, Hum. Rts.
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punishment for specific offences against fundamental rights, such as
arbitrary execution and torture. 21 According to the authoritative
interpretation of the Committee, the duty to investigate, prosecute,
and punish is inherent to the general obligation to “respect and
ensure” the rights recognized in the Covenant, established in article
2.1. Similarly, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights has
derived the specific obligation to investigate, prosecute, and punish
from the general obligation to “respect and ensure” the free and full
exercise of fundamental rights, established in article 1.1 of the
American Convention of Human Rights. 22 In the landmark Velasquez
Rodríquez Case, 23 the Court held that “[a]s a consequence of this
obligation, the States must prevent, investigate and punish any
violation of the rights recognized by the Convention.” 24
The scope of the duty to investigate and prosecute, while not
completely clear, encompasses at least the core international crimes
of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, and other
grave offences against fundamental rights, such as extrajudicial
executions and arbitrary detentions. Those responsible for these
abuses as authors, instigators, or accomplices must be identified,
tried and punished.
States may not enact amnesty laws nor grant pardons to avoid
compliance with their obligation to investigate gross human rights
violations and to hold perpetrators accountable. 25 There is consensus
among the international community that serious violations of human
rights that constitute international crimes of jus cogens cannot be
subject to amnesties, because the obligation to prosecute is inherent
Comm., 124, para. 11, U.N. Doc. A/38/40, U.N. GAOR, Suppl. No. 40 (1983);
ICCPR General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (Art. 2), Hum. Rts. Comm., ¶ 18, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).
21. General Comment No. 6: The Right to Life (Art. 6), Hum. Rts Comm., 6,
¶ 3, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 27, 1982); General Comment No. 20:
Replaces General Comment No. 7 concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel
Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7), Hum. Rts. Comm., 32, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 1 (Apr. 3, 1992).
22. American Convention on Human Rights art. 1, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention].
23. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 166 (July 29, 1988).
24. Id.
25. See generally OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS, RULE OF
LAW TOOLS FOR POST CONFLICT STATES, U.N. Sales No. E.09.XIV.1 (2009).
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to this category. 26 International human rights bodies have made clear
that amnesty laws are not allowed even for the purposes of
pacification or reconciliation during democratic transitions. The
Committee on Human Rights has rejected the argument that
amnesties are necessary to ensure human rights after authoritarian
regimes. To the contrary, amnesties contribute to an atmosphere of
impunity, which may encourage further abuses. 27 The InterAmerican Commission of Human Rights has held that amnesty laws
violate numerous provisions of the Convention because they are
contrary to the duty to ensure human rights and to the victim’s rights
to justice and to truth. 28 Likewise, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights in Barrios Altos v. Peru 29 expressly declared that
amnesty laws intended to prevent the prosecution and punishment of
violations of fundamental rights are inadmissible. 30
The main rationale of the obligation to investigate and prosecute
serious human rights violations is deterrence. 31 Since impunity
encourages further violations of human rights, prosecution and
punishment of offenders is regarded as a necessary measure to
prevent future abuses. The deterrence foundation is implied in the
jurisprudence of international human rights bodies, which have
identified the obligation to investigate and prosecute as an inherent

26. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 21.
27. See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Chile, ¶ 7,
Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.104 (1999); Preliminary
Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Peru, ¶ 9, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 67 (July 25, 1996); Rodriguez v. Uruguay, Commc’n. No.
322/1988, ¶ 12.4, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988 (1994).
28. See Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Second Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in Peru, OEA/Ser.L/V/II/.106, doc. 59 rev. ¶ 221 (2000); Parada Cea v. El
Salvador, Case 10.480, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 1/99,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 doc. 7 rev. ¶ 107 (1999).
29. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 41 (Mar. 14, 2001).
30. The Court expressly declared that:
[A]ll amnesty provisions, provisions on prescription and the establishment of measures
designed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to
prevent the investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights
violations such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and forced
disappearance, all of them prohibited because they violate non-derogable rights
recognized by international human rights law.

Barrios Altos, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 41.
31. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2600-01.
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aspect of the duty to “respect and ensure” human rights. 32 Further,
this rationale has been explicitly announced in several international
treaties. For instance, the Preamble of the Convention on the NonApplicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity states that “the effective punishment of war
crimes and crimes against humanity is an important element in the
prevention of such crimes, the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms.” 33 More recently, the Rome Statute expressed
the determination of the international community “to put an end to
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to
the prevention of such crimes.” 34
In addition to the deterrence rationale, the organs of the InterAmerican human rights system have developed an independent
justification grounded on the victims’ rights. 35 This rationale regards
the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of offenders as a
remedy in the individual interest of victims, who are entitled to a
“right to justice.” The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has
derived this right from the provisions granting a right to a fair trial
and to judicial protection. 36 In the Durand and Ugarte Case, 37 the
Court held that:
Article 8(1) of the American Convention, in connection with Article 25(1)
thereof, confers to victims’ relatives the right to investigate their
disappearance and death by State authorities, to carry out a process
against the liable parties of unlawful acts, to impose the corresponding
sanctions, and to compensate damages suffered by their relatives. 38

Thus, States must prosecute and punish serious human rights
violations not just to prevent further abuses, but to provide justice
and closure to the victims of the crimes already perpetrated.
Although this independent rationale has been expressly recognized
only in the Inter-American context, it seems to be gaining increasing

32. See id.
33. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Dec. 16, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73.
34. See Rome Statute, supra note 7.
35. SEIBERT-FOHR, supra note 1, at 281-82.
36. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 8(1), 25(1).
37. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 68 (Aug. 16, 2000).
38. Id. ¶ 130.
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acceptance in the international community. 39
In sum, the obligation to investigate and prosecute serious human
rights violations is well established by international customary law,
several specific human rights conventions, and the authoritative
interpretation of universal and regional human rights treaties. This
obligation has a broad scope and amnesty laws for these crimes have
been expressly repudiated. The two underlying justifications of this
duty are deterrence of further violations of human rights and the
victim’s right to justice.

III. THE NEED FOR PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION
A. STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF MASSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
The fulfillment of the obligation to investigate and prosecute
serious human rights violations poses a daunting challenge for States.
After armed conflicts or dictatorial regimes, political concerns may
discourage new governments from pursuing truth and justice. 40
Those responsible for the abuses may retain power to facilitate the
transition and obstruct any attempt to investigate past atrocities. 41
But even when political stability is guaranteed and the authorities are
willing to abide by the international obligation to investigate and
prosecute, structural limits of domestic justice systems may impede
the proper discharge of that duty. 42 The special characteristics of
39. See SEIBERT-FOHR, supra note 1, at 22-3 (discussing the Human Rights
Committee’s shifting trend from viewing punishment as a means of prevention or
deterrence to viewing punishment as a remedy). It is also indicative of this trend
the fact that The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted by G.A. res.
60/147, Dec. 6 2005, expressly states that “[i]n cases of gross violations . . .
constituting crimes under international law, States have the duty to investigate and,
if there is sufficient evidence, the duty to submit to prosecution the person
allegedly responsible . . . and, if found guilty, the duty to punish . . . .”).
40. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2596-98 (illustrating that in
Argentina, newly elected President Raul Alfonsin tried to abate protracted
prosecution against lower-level military personnel for fear of risking a military
uprising).
41. See, e.g., id.; CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 77 (1996).
42. See Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2596.
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human rights abuses raise considerable practical obstacles for its
investigation and prosecution.
Serious human rights violations often imply the commission of
myriad of crimes, many more than what domestic justice systems can
process. 43 Large-scale abuses perpetrated during relatively prolonged
armed conflicts or tyrannical regimes may victimize thousands or
even millions of individuals. 44 These crimes are necessarily
committed by large numbers of individuals, who are members of
State agencies or similarly organized groups. 45 Even well-resourced
systems may be overwhelmed by the extraordinary amount of cases
generated in these circumstances. 46
Moreover, the crimes committed in these contexts are particularly
complex and difficult to prove, which make their investigation even
more costly and time-consuming. 47 For instance, proving the
elements of a crime against humanity is burdensome since this crime
requires showing that the particular act charged, e.g. a murder, was
committed in the context of a systematic and generalized attack
against the civil population. 48 Likewise, the prosecution of high-level
offenders requires proving complex structures of command to
connect the defendant with the specific act. 49
Additional obstacles arise from practical difficulties in collecting
evidence of these crimes. Serious violations of human rights are
usually committed clandestinely and offenders make deliberate
efforts to conceal their participation and to eliminate incriminating
43. See id. at 2599-2600.
44. See Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 10 n.6 (providing figures of estimated
deaths in “situations producing a high level of victimization . . . including
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes for which there has been no
accountability”).
45. See Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 1; see, e.g., NINO, supra note 41, at 10-14
(describing the hundreds of thousands of trials that took place across Europe in the
aftermath of World War II, indicting and trying persons who had allied with the
Nazis).
46. See Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2596 (suggesting that
even highly functioning judicial systems such as the criminal justice system in the
United States could have difficulty prosecuting as many cases as Argentina was
expected to process after the “dirty war”).
47. NANCY A. COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
CONSTRUCTING A RESTORATIVE APPROACH 41 (2007).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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evidence. 50 The archetypical example of this practice is the crime of
enforced disappearance. By definition, this crime implies the
suppression of any evidence, including the very person of the victim,
and the subsequent refusal to provide information about his or her
fate. 51 Other crimes, like acts of torture committed behind the walls
of military facilities, or summary executions in a remote rural
community, are equally difficult to prove. 52 Most of the time, the
prosecution is unable to find witnesses of these crimes and on the
rare occasions where witnesses are available, they may provide little
information. 53 In these situations, offenders are usually the only ones
who know the facts and possess the necessary evidence to carry out
the prosecutions. 54
All of these structural constraints are accentuated at the outset of
transitions from armed conflicts or tyrannical regimes when the
judiciary is weak and often corrupted. 55 Rebuilding justice systems
takes time, and when they are working at maximum capacity, the
investigations are usually more difficult because of the loss of
evidence. Finally, the normative and ethical imperative to conduct
human rights prosecutions with the same guarantees afforded to any
criminal defendant considerably increases costs and the pressure on
the judicial system. 56

B. THE ARGENTINE CASE: AN HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OF THE
STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES
In the past decade, Argentina has been carrying on a large scale

50. Diane F. Orentlicher, Bearing Witness: The Art and Science of Human
Rights Fact-Finding, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 83, 131-32 (1990) [hereinafter
Orentlicher, Bearing Witness].
51. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute
Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 451, 454
(1990).
52. See Orentlicher, Bearing Witness, supra note 50, at 94-95.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 51, at 510-11 (observing that new
governmets are fragile and easily deterred from prosecuting human rights
violations because of the likelihood of political unrest or military uprising).
56. Nancy Amoury Combs, Plea Bargains in International Criminal
Prosecutions, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 516, 562 (M. Cherif Bassiouni
ed., 3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter Plea Bargains].
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process of investigation and prosecution of past abuses. 57 This
experience demonstrates the problems that arise when a domestic
system of criminal prosecution is required to investigate and
prosecute all crimes committed in a context of massive violations of
human rights. 58
During the 1976-1983 military dictatorship, the “Military Juntas”
established a systematic plan to kidnap political dissidents, torture
them in clandestine detention camps, and finally disappeared them. 59
According to official records, approximately 10,000 people were
victims of these crimes; but human rights groups claim that the
number of victims rises as high as 30,000. 60
Democratically elected President Raúl Alfonsín pushed forward a
comprehensive transition program, which included the investigation
of the atrocities committed during the dictatorship and the criminal
prosecution of a few high-ranked officers. 61 In 1985, a civil court
convicted five members of the “Military Juntas” in a historic trial
regarded worldwide as a successful experience of transitional
justice. 62 However, two military insurrections obliged the Argentine
Congress to pass the “Full Stop Law” and the “Due Obedience Law,”
two amnesty laws that foreclosed the prosecution of human rights
violations. 63 In 1989 and 1990, President Carlos Menem granted
57. See Background: Thirty Thousand Gone, but “Never Again”, INT’L CTR.
TRANSITIONAL
JUST.,
https://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-andcountries/argentina (last visited Oct. 24, 2015).
58. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2560.
59. Nunca Mas (Never Again), NAT’L COMM’N ON THE DISAPPEARNCE OF
PERSONS (1984),
http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/
nevagain/nevagain_000.htm.
60. See Uki Goni, Blaming the victims: dictatorship denialism is on the rise in
Argentina, GUARDIAN, Aug. 29, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/
aug/29/argentina-denial-dirty-war-genocide-mauricio-macri.
61. See See NINO, supra note 41, at 67, 69 (describing President Alfonsiden
comprehensive plan to first, search for the disappeared persons; then to punish
perpetrators of the disappearances by reforming the legal system; and then to
prevent the disappearances from happening again by ratifying international human
rights treaties and creating stronger human rights protection mechanisms).
62. Cámara Nacional de Casación Penal [C.N.C.P.] [National Court of
Appeals on Criminal Matters] 9/12/1985, “Juicio a las Juntas Militares”
[“Judgment of the Military Juntas”], 13/84 (Arg.), http://www.internationalcrimes
database.org/Case/1118#p3.
63. See Law No. 23.492, Dec. 24, 1986 (Arg.); see also Law No. 23.521, Jun.
8, 1987 (Arg.).
FOR
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pardons to those military officers convicted during the past
administration and to several others who were still under
prosecution, with the alleged purpose of favoring “national
reconciliation.” 64 The government position toward the past radically
changed during the Néstor Kirchner administration. 65 In 2003,
Congress passed an act declaring that the “Full Stop” and “Due
Obedience” laws were null and void. 66 In 2005, the Supreme Court
declared that amnesty laws were unconstitutional in the Simón
Case; 67 and in 2007 it declared the same with respect to pardons in
the Mazzeo Case. In this way, after almost twenty years of impunity,
all legal barriers that prevented the investigation and prosecution of
the crimes committed during the military regime were removed and
hundreds of cases were reopened all around the country.
Victims of the dictatorship and human rights groups played a key
role in the configuration of the current process of accountability in
Argentina. They constantly opposed the government’s measures that
tended to foreclose criminal prosecution and developed a complex
political and legal strategy to bring about truth and justice. 68 Before
the nullification of amnesty laws, this strategy included “truth trials,”
criminal trials in other countries, and public demonstrations. 69 After
official investigations and prosecutions restarted, many victims and
human rights organizations acted as private prosecutors in the
64. See Daniel W. Schwartz, Rectifying Twenty-Five Years of Material
Breach: Argentina and the Legacy of the ‘Dirty War’ in International Law, 18
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 317, 333-34 (2004).
65. Argentine Mothers Rejoice at Repeal of Amnesty Laws, CHI. TRIB. (Aug.
22, 2003), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-08-22/news/0308220288_1_
human-rights-amnesty-laws-military-officers.
66. Act 25.779 entitled “Declaration of Nullity of the Due Obedience and the
Full Stop Laws”, published on the Argentine books (Boletin Oficial de la
República Argentina) on 9/3/2003.
67. See Gaspar Forteza, Regarding Simón y Otros: Accountability in Argentina
and International Human Rights as Domestic Positive Law, 3 FIU L. REV. 187,
188 (2007).
68. Id. at 196.
69. After amnesty laws were passed precluding criminal proceedings against
perpetrators of past human rights crimes, victims’ families sought “truth trials” in
courts where the courts sought information about what had happened to the the
disappeared. See Kathryn Sikkink, From Pariah State to Global Protagonist:
Argentina and the Struggle for International Human Rights, 50 LATIN AM. POL. &
SOC’Y 1, 1, 11-13 (2008) (lauding the Argentine use of innovative techniques and
methods to bring perpetrators of the disappearances to justice).
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criminal cases, as allowed by Argentine procedural law. 70 Most
victims and organizations claimed that every crime should be
investigated and that all of those responsible should be prosecuted
and punished. 71
Moreover, Argentine procedural criminal law prohibits the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 72 Unlike the U.S. system, the
Argentine system is based on the European inquisitorial model and is
governed by the principle of mandatory prosecution. 73 This principle
requires prosecutors to promote the investigation and prosecution of
every infraction to criminal law that comes to their knowledge. 74
They cannot forego prosecution based on economic, political, or
practical criteria. 75 These legal constraints forced prosecutors to go
after all of the offenders for all of the crimes committed during the
dictatorship against tens of thousands of victims. 76
During the past decade, around 500 individuals have been
convicted on counts of crimes against humanity, and more than 1,000

70. Verónica Michel & Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights Prosecutions and the
Participation of Victims in Latin America, 47 L. & SOC’Y REV. 873, 886-89, 891
(2013) (asserting that after the amnesty laws were passed to prevent further
litigation against military junta members, victims and human rights organizations
used every method they could, including private prosecution, to keep cases open;
on average private prosecutors kept cases open for six years longer than state
prosecutors, thereby leading to several high profile sentencings including the
detentions of ex-president Rafael Videla and Admiral Emilio Massera).
71. See NINO, supra note 41, at 112 (stating that “[t]he human rights groups’
stance toward retroactive justice was intransigently retributive. They sought to
punish each and every person responsible for the abuses, regardless of their degree
of involvement.”); see also Claudio Tamburrini, Trading Truth for Justice?, 10
RES PUBLICA 153 (Special Issue) (2010). For a more recent exposition of the
retributive position, see Christopher K. Hall, The Danger of Selective Justice: All
Cases Involving Crimes under International Law Should be Investigated and the
Suspects, when there is Sufficient Admissible Evidence, Prosecuted, in CRITERIA
FOR PRIORITIZING AND SELECTING CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES CASES 171
(Morten Bergsmo ed., 2d ed. 2010).
72. See ALEJANDRO CARRIO, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ARGENTINA: AN
OVERVIEW FOR AMERICAN READERS 4, 7-11 (1989).
73. See id.
74. Andrew S. Brown, Adiós Amnesty: Prosecutorial Discretion and Military
Trials in Argentina, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 203, 218 (2002).
75. See id. (stating that prosecutors in Argentina are required to bring a case if
all of the elements of the crime are satisfied).
76. See id.

GAITAN- FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

1/24/2017 5:05 PM

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

553

have been indicted. 77 However, despite the great advances made, the
Argentine system of criminal prosecution has faced dramatic
difficulties in proceeding in such an extraordinary number of cases. 78
Moreover the absolute prohibition of prosecutorial discretion has
increased the problem. Some adverse consequences of the attempt to
investigate and prosecute every crime include:
(1) Excessive duration of the investigations: The investigations of
these crimes restarted exactly one decade ago, but they remain far
from finished. Instead, the number of defendants indicted and
victims identified continues to increase every year. 79 Because of the
slow pace of the investigations, many defendants have died before
trial.
(2) Excessive length of the trials: Trials against several defendants
for many crimes are excessively lengthy and costly. For instance, a
trial for crimes committed at the “ESMA” 80 involving eighteen
defendants and eighty-six victims lasted twenty-two months.
According to a report prepared by the prosecutor’s office, a further
trial involving sixty-five defendants and 793 victims would last five
years. 81 Such a lengthy trial not only entails high financial costs, but
also a high risk that defendants die before a verdict can be
pronounced.
(3) De facto selection of cases: Faced with an inevitable shortage
77. PROCURADURÍA DE CRIMENES CONTRA LA HUMANIDAD DEL MINISTERIO
PUBLICO FISCAL DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA [CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY UNIT
OF THE ARGENTINE GENERAL ATTORNEY’S OFFICE], INFORME SOBRE EL ESTADO
DE LAS CAUSAS POR V IOLACIONES A LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS COMETIDAS
DURANTE EL TERRORISMO DE ESTADO [REPORT ON THE CAUSES OF HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED DURING THE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP] 1, 2
(2013) [hereinafter Report on Causes of Human Rights Violations].
78. See Mirna Goransky & Maria Luisa Pique, (The Lack of) Criteria for the
Selection of Crimes Against Humanity Cases: The Case of Argentina, in CRITERIA
FOR PRIORITIZING AND SELECTING CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES CASES 91, 104
(Morten Bergsmo ed., 2d ed., 2010) (outlining the various difficulties in the
prosecution of the Argentine military junta including inefficiencies relating to a
lack of prosecutorial discretion).
79. Report on Causes of Human Rights Violations, supra note 77, at 2.
80. The “ESMA” (School of Mechanics of the Argentine Navy) was one of the
biggest clandestine centers of detention during the military dictatorship. See
Goransky & Pique, supra note 78, at 102 (describing the alleged crimes committed
at ESMA).
81. Juzgado Federal 22 [Juzg. Fed.] [lower federal courts], Buenos Aires,
30/12/2011, “ESMA” Case, Prosecutor’s Brief, unpublished.
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of resources to investigate and prosecute all of the cases, prosecutors
and courts are forced to prioritize, even when such practice is
formally prohibited. The problem with de facto selection of cases is
the risk of application of illegitimate criteria, and the lack of
accountability for the decision not to prosecute certain cases. 82 Most
prosecutors and courts focus on the easiest cases (those more
documented) and disregard hard cases, in which more complex
investigations are required. 83 For instance, in the investigation of the
crimes committed in the military barracks of Campo de Mayo the
court and the prosecutor focused on high ranking officials and did
not proceed with the prosecution of other offenders. 84 As a
consequence, the commander of that unit was tried and convicted six
times for several counts of crimes against humanity, 85 while other
individuals who directly executed acts of torture or murder have not
even been indicted yet.
(4) Irrational allocation of resources: The requirement that every
crime be brought to justice led to an irrational allocation of
resources. Many offenders continue to be prosecuted regardless of
whether it was necessary to deter further abuses or satisfy the
victim’s rights. 86 For example, in 2010 former Dictator Jorge Videla
was indicted for 571 counts of crimes against humanity, although he
had already been convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment,
which was the maximum sentence. 87
(5) Incapability of solving complex cases: The crimes prosecuted
until now are mainly those that were documented during the 1980s

82. Goransky & Pique, supra note 78, at 91.
83. See id. at 101 (listing the reasons Prosecutors chose to pursue certain cases
in Argentina).
84. PROCURADURIA DE CRIMENES CONTRA LA HUMANIDAD DEL MINISTERIO
PUBLICO FISCAL DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA [CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY UNIT
OF THE ARGENTINE GENERAL ATTORNEY’S OFFICE], LISTADO DE CONDENADOS A
JUNIO 2014 [LIST OF CONVICTIONS TO JUNE 2014] 1 (2014),
http://www.fiscales.gob.ar/lesa-humanidad/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2014/06/
Lista-de-condenados-a-junio-de-2014.pdf.
85. Id. at 5.
86. See Goransky & Pique, supra note 78, at 104 (describing the potential
detriment to witnesses, due process protections, and judicial efficiency caused by
the selection of cases in Argentina).
87. Juzgado Federal [Juzg. Fed.] [lower federal courts], 25/9/2008, “Primer
Cuerpo de Ejercito,” Indictment, La Ley [L.L.] (2008) (Arg.).
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by CONADEP, 88 the Argentine Truth Commission. Because of the
lack of witnesses and other evidence, the system is virtually
incapable of identifying most of the offenders who acted
clandestinely. As a consequence, an undetermined but presumably
high number of offenders remain unpunished. 89
(6) Surreptitious granting of immunity to defendants who appear
as witnesses at trials: Pressed for the need for insider evidence,
several prosecutors and courts have admitted the testimony of
individuals implicated in the commission of the crimes as if they
were mere witnesses. 90 For example, in the case for the crimes
committed at Campo de Mayo, a sergeant called Victor Ibáñez
testified as a key witness for the prosecution against other offenders,
despite his proven collaboration in the commission of the crimes. 91
This shows that the granting of immunity for cooperation is simply
inevitable in some circumstances, even when it is formally
prohibited. 92 Regulating this practice by keeping prosecutors
accountable before victims and society is more preferable than
tolerating its exercise outside the law. 93

88. The CONADEP (Comision Nacional sobre la Desaparicionde Personas)
[National Commission on the Disappearance of People] was created by President
Alfonsrs as an essential part of his program of democratic transition. The
CONADEP produced the report Nunca Mas (Never Again), NAT’L COMM’N ON
THE DISAPPEARNCE OF PERSONS (1984), http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/
web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_000.htm.
89. Brown, supra note 74, at 219.
90. See Alex Obote-Odora, Case Selection and Prioritization Criteria at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in CRITERIA FOR PRIORITIZING AND
SELECTING CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES CASES 45, 53 (Morten Bergsmo ed., 2d
ed. 2010) (stating the general proposition that witnesses who are also perpetrated
should be tried as well).
91. The defense attorney objected to this testimony arguing that the witness
“served in the logistics sector at Campo de Mayo, which means that he is related to
the events investigated even if he has not been formally charged” [translation by
the author]. This objection was rejected by the Court. See Camara Nacional de
Casacion [CNCP] [National Court of Appeal on Criminal Matters: highest federal
court on criminal matters], 7/12/2012, “Riveros, Santiago Omar y otros s/recursos
de casacion,” Registro [Register] No. 20905 (Arg.) [hereinafter CNCP Case].
92. Indeed this practice constitutes a criminal offence under Argentinean law.
See CÓDIGO PENAL [CÓD. PEN] [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 274 (1984) (Arg.).
93. Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United
States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717, 731 (2006).
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C. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AS A NECESSARY TOOL TO
OVERCOME STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES
Granting prosecutors some discretion is a legal mechanism to
overcome structural obstacles for the investigation and prosecution
of massive crimes. Prosecutorial discretion allows for a selection of
cases in order to reduce workloads and optimize the allocation of
resources. 94 This power allows prosecutors to choose to forego
punishment in certain cases with the purpose of saving financial and
human resources to investigate other cases considered more
important. 95 Further, prosecutors can also use their discretion to
obtain evidence of certain complex crimes. They can offer immunity
or lenient treatment to persons implicated in the commission of
crimes in exchange for their collaboration in the investigation and
testimony at trial as “crown witnesses.” 96
The case of the United States powerfully illustrates the use of
prosecutorial discretion with these aims. American prosecutors, both
on the federal and the state level, exercise considerable discretion in
deciding whether or not to prosecute a case. 97 One of the most
common explanations of this practice is the limitations in available
enforcement resources. 98 Prosecutors also use their discretionary
powers to induce offenders to cooperate with the prosecution of other
persons, acting as informants in the investigatory stage and as
witnesses at trial, in exchange for immunity. 99 Alternatively, as part
of plea bargain negotiations, prosecutors may sign “cooperation
agreements” reducing the sentences of offenders who agree to
94. See JENIA I. TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS: CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, 13 (Hiram E. Chodosh ed. 2009) (stating that case selection allows
states to conserve limited resources so that they may be used for cases that require
such resources).
95. Id.
96. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL,
158 (2003) (explaining that the concept of “crown witness” appeared in England in
the 17th century).
97. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2(a) (3d ed.
2014) (overviewing the precedent and practice of prosecutorial discretion in the
United States).
98. Id. (“No prosecutor has sufficient resources available to prosecute all of
the offenses which come to his attention. [Thus] the prosecutor must remain free to
exercise his judgment in determining what prosecutions will best serve the public
interest.”).
99. Id.
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collaborate. 100 These practices are considered indispensable tools in
the investigation and prosecution of complex crimes. 101
Prosecutorial discretion has also been increasingly applied at
international criminal tribunals. Despite the initial reluctance to
apply discretion in relation to core international crimes, the
international tribunals have finally accepted it as an inevitable
consequence of limited material resources and the difficulty to obtain
evidence. 102 The case of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) 103 is particularly demonstrative of this
process. Originally, the ICTY’s rules did not contemplate the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion to obtain information from
defendants in exchange for immunity. 104 A proposal made by the
United States to include a provision expressly authorizing such
practice was rejected. 105 The ICTY’s then president, Antonio
Cassese, explained that:
persons appearing before us will be charged with genocide, torture,
murder, sexual assault, wanton destruction, persecution, and other
inhuman acts. After due reflection, we have decided that no one should be
immune from prosecution for crimes such as these, no matter how useful
their testimony may otherwise be. 106

However, this emphatic rejection of prosecutorial discretion gave
way to pressure from the international community to reduce the costs
of the proceedings and to the need for the insider testimony of
defendants. 107 After the adoption of completion strategies in 2003,
ITCY prosecutors engaged in aggressive plea bargaining, and even
withdrew charges of genocide and crimes against humanity to obtain
not only guilty-pleas, but also evidence against other defendants. 108
By September 2006, forty-eight defendants had been prosecuted,
100. TURNER, supra note 94, at 30, 31.
101. Jenia I. Turner reports that “prosecutors point out that, without the
cooperation of insiders, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to bring down
large-scale or sophisticated conspiracies.” Id. at 34.
102. Plea Bargains, supra note 56, at 562.
103. S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).
104. Plea Bargains, supra note 56, at 561.
105. Id. (explaining that the gravity of the crimes at issue and the peace and
security mission of the court appeared at odds with the process of plea bargaining).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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nineteen of whom pleaded guilty and six testified as witnesses for the
prosecution. 109

IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW ALLOWS
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION BUT IMPOSES
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LIMITS
A. CONSTRUING THE OBLIGATION TO INVESTIGATE AND
PROSECUTE AS ALLOWING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
The question of whether international law allows prosecutorial
discretion in the investigation and prosecution of serious human
rights violations has not been squarely addressed by international
human rights bodies and scholars. 110 Scholarly works have mainly
focused on the limits to this obligation derived from political
concerns, and particularly on the question of whether amnesty laws
are admissible under international law. 111 It is not surprising that
amnesty issues have taken central stage; most States have granted
amnesties for the atrocities committed in the past decades all around
the world. 112 However, recent pronouncements of internationals
human rights bodies have emphatically rejected amnesties laws,
making it necessary to consider whether there are other tools to
handle the influx of cases. In particular, whether States may use
prosecutorial discretion to overcome practical obstacles derived from
structural limitations of domestic justice systems.
General principles of construction of international obligations lead
to the conclusion that international law does not ban the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in the investigation and prosecution of
massive human rights abuses. Although some decisions of
international human rights bodies suggest that States are required to
investigate every serious offense, 113 this obligation should not be
109. Id.
110. Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law
and General Principles of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty
Possible?, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 173, 175 (2003).
111. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2540; Roht-Arriaza, supra
note 51, at 453.
112. Slye, supra note 110, at 175 (describing examples of states granting
amnesties).
113. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Uruguay, supra note 27, at 33 (stating that “[t]he
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construed as imposing an impracticable task on prosecutors and the
judiciary. 114 As the Argentine case demonstrates, even if a State is
genuinely willing to abide by international law, its domestic criminal
systems may simply lack the operative capacity to investigate and
prosecute every single offense when tens of thousands of crimes
have been committed by thousands of offenders. 115 No domestic
justice system, even one of a developed country, has the operative
capacity to prosecute all of the crimes committed in its jurisdiction.
And, as discussed above, the investigation and prosecution of crimes
committed in contexts of widespread violations of human rights are
even more costly and time-consuming.
Construing the international duty to investigate and prosecute as
requireing States to go after those responsible for every single crime
would be not only unrealistic, but also detrimental to the goals of the
obligation itself. Indeed, an absolute prohibition on prosecutorial
discretion would deprive States of a necessary tool to remove the
structural obstacles that impede the fulfilment of that obligation,
since prosecutorial discretion is an effective means to control the
workloads and to obtain valuable evidence and eyewitness accounts.
Providing prosecutors with some discretionary powers enhances their
ability to investigate and prosecute more cases and improves the
levels of accountability and deterrence. Therefore, prosecutorial
discretion is plainly consistent with the idea of preventing further
violations of human rights.
It may be contended that the exercise of discretion in a particular
case may infringe on the victim’s rights. 116 However, admitting so is
not to say that this practice is incompatible with international law.
The victims’ rights to truths and justice, as fundamental rights, are
not absolute and can be subject to reasonable limitations under

State is obligated to investigate every situation involving a violation of the rights
protected by the Convention.”).
114. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2600 (“pursuant to general
canons of construction, the comprehensive treaties should be interpreted in a
manner that avoids imposing impossible obligations or duties whose discharge
would prove harmful.”).
115. See Goransky & Pique, supra note 78, at 105 (describing the problems
caused by a lack of capacity in the Argentine judicial system).
116. See Brown, supra note 74, at 222 (explaining that the gravity of the crime
may make the exercise of discretion morally complicated).
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certain circumstances. 117 Limitations on these rights are justified
when they are necessary to guarantee the rights of other victims and
the general interest of society in knowing the truth and preventing
further violations of human rights. 118 Prosecutorial discretion is
allowed to the extent that it allows a more comprehensive truth
telling and a more efficient prosecution of those responsible for the
crimes, ensuring that a larger number of victims have their rights to
truth and justice guaranteed. 119

B. INTERNATIONAL LAW IMPOSES LIMITS TO
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
As just explained, the international obligation to investigate and
prosecute should not be interpreted as prohibiting prosecutorial
discretion in the context of gross violations of human rights. That is
not to say, however, that every exercise of discretion is admissible.
On the contrary, international law establishes strict conditions and
places substantial constraints on this practice. 120 Substantive and
procedural limits may be derived from the scope of the obligation to
investigate and prosecute, its underlying rationales, and general
principles of international human rights law. These limits will be
examined in turn.
1. Substantive Limits
Prosecutorial discretion may only be used as a tool to overcome
actual obstacles in the functioning of the justice system that impede
the fulfillment of the obligation to investigate and prosecute. This
limit is a necessary consequence of the broad scope of the
international duty. States have an obligation to investigate, prosecute,
and punish those found guilty of serious violations of human rights
and they must make a good faith effort to discharge that obligation to

117. Frédéric Mégret, Nature of Obligations, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 124, 141 (Daniel Moeckli et al. eds., 2010).
118. Id.
119. See id. (explaining that international law allows for limitations on the
exercise of human rights when it is in the interest of promoting other’s rights).
120. Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 21 (arguing that “national prosecutions [of
international crimes] should include all persons who have committed criminal acts,
subject however to reasonable and justified prosecutorial discretion.”).
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the maximum of their possibilities.121 States must “organize the
governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through
which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of
juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights.” 122
Thus, they cannot allege their own inaction as a legitimate obstacle
to comply with the obligation to investigate and prosecute.
Prosecutorial discretion may be used only to overcome structural
obstacles derived from the special characteristics of serious human
rights violations, namely the backlogs produced by a massive
number of cases and the difficulty of collecting evidence.
In this aspect, lawful use of prosecutorial discretion is
distinguishable from other outlawed measures whose main objective
is to provide impunity, such as amnesties or pardons. As explained
above, States may not adopt amnesties to prevent the investigation
and prosecution of core international crimes and other grave offenses
against fundamental rights. Accordingly, States may not circumvent
this prohibition by applying prosecutorial discretion. Similarly,
States may not use prosecutorial discretion to shield a defendant
from criminal prosecution at international level. A decision to grant
immunity to a defendant designed to prevent that person from being
held accountable and without any useful purpose for the
investigation and prosecution of other crimes would be contrary to
international law. In these situations, the Rome Statute allows the
Court to exercise its complementary jurisdiction. 123
The basic standard to determine whether a State has applied
discretion within these bounds is straightforward: Where the result of
prosecutorial discretion, in the general balance, is a more complete
investigation of the crimes and a more effective prosecution of those
responsible, the State has properly exercised that power. 124
Conversely, where the result is greater impunity than what would
121. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2551 (stating the general
proposition that international law requires the investigation, prosecution, and
punishment of those who commit serious human rights abuses).
122. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
123. Rodriguez v. Uruguay, supra note 27, at 31.
124. Rome Statute, supra note 7, arts. 17(1)(b), 17(2)(a) (“the proceedings [at
the domestic level] were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made
for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”).
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have otherwise existed, the State has applied prosecutorial discretion
beyond its limits and has failed in the fulfillment of the international
duty to investigate and prosecute. 125
Determining whether prosecutorial discretion has been applied in a
manner compatible with international law in a particular case is more
complex. Prosecutorial discretion may be exercised in relation with
(a) perpetrators, (b) victims, and/or (c) charges. Consider these
examples: (a) a prosecutor may refrain from prosecuting a certain
defendant in exchange for his or her cooperation in the prosecution
of other individuals; or (b) she may decide not to prosecute the
crimes committed against certain victims in order to reduce the
workloads; or (c), instead of prosecuting a defendant for all of the
crimes committed against a victim, she may withdraw some charges
in order to reduce the length of the trial and save resources. Different
concerns arise in each situation, and thus the standard for the
admissibility of prosecutorial discretion differs.
In situation (a), both deterrence and victim’s rights may be
undercut, thus the test needs to be stringent: A prosecutor should
only be permitted to offer leniency or immunity to a defendant if the
benefits to the investigation outweigh the costs in terms of impunity
and dissatisfaction of the individual interest of the victims. To
determine the benefits, the prosecutor must consider the quantity and
the quality of the information provided by the defendant―to what
extent does it help to discover the truth―and the difficulty of
obtaining that evidence by other means. 126 To determine the costs,
the prosecutor must consider the degree to which deterrence is
jeopardized, the seriousness of the offences committed by the
defendant and his or her culpability, and the number of individuals
victimized by the defendant. This test would foreclose, for instance,
the reduction of punishment to a high-level official with chief
responsibility in the execution of thousands of crimes, but would
allow the grant of immunity to a low ranking official who acted as a
guard in a detention camp, who could provide inside information
about the detained victims and the individuals who committed acts of
torture and murders.
125. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2598 (analyzing the theory
and practice of the obligation to prosecute).
126. Id.
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In situation (b), the test should be similar, but focused on the
victim’s rights that are at stake: The decision to not prosecute a
defendant for the crimes committed against certain victims is
permittable only if the benefits of the prosecution outweigh the
sacrifice of the victim’s rights. To determine the benefits, the
prosecutor must evaluate the general availability of material
resources, the backlogs in the system, the extent of resources saved
by the decision, and the demands for those resources to investigate
and prosecute other crimes. To determine the sacrifice of the victim’s
rights the prosecutor must consider the number of cases involved, the
subjective interest of the victims in the prosecution of the defendant,
and whether the victims have had their cases prosecuted against other
defendants. Often, it will be unfeasible for the prosecution to charge
a defendant with all of the crimes attributable to him. 127 Consider for
example the case of the leader of a tyrannical regime responsible for
the enforced disappearances of tens of thousands of individuals. In
such a situation, it would be reasonable to prosecute the offender for
a number of cases representative of the atrocities committed that are
sufficient to obtain the maximum punishment. The selection of cases
should be made following objective criteria, such as the availability
of evidence, the seriousness of the crimes, and the geographical and
temporal distribution of the cases. Equally important, when selecting
the cases, prosecutors must avoid discrimination against a victim or
groups of victims based on race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or
political ideology.
Finally, in situation (c)—discretion in charging decisions
involving the ame victim— the only concern is the deterrening effect
of punishment. Here, prosecutors may exercise their discretionary
power with greater amplitude: as long as the deterrent effect is
ensured, the withdrawal of charges against a defendant is reasonable.
According to this test, prosecutors may choose to charge only the
most serious crimes and forego lesser ones. 128 But it would be
unreasonable if a prosecutor decides, for example, to prosecute a
defendant for abduction and withdraw charges of torture and murder.
127. See Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and
Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97
AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 520 (2003) (explaining the importance of weighing the
logistical effects of case selection by the Prosecutor of the ICC).
128. Id.
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However, the general prohibition of discrimination imposes an
independent limit to this power. Prosecutors may not forego the
prosecution of certain crimes when that decision, as applied, would
result in the discrimination against certain victims. 129 For instance, a
decision to not prosecute rape or other gender-based crimes that
mostly affect women would be discriminatory against that collective,
and therefore forbidden by international law.
2.

Procedural Limits

International law poses two procedural limits on the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. First, victims must have a judicial recourse
to ensure that their right to justice is not unreasonably limited by the
decision to not prosecute their cases. 130 Second, the circumstances in
which a prosecutor may exercise discretion and the criteria for doing
so must be determined by law. 131
These limits particularly apply in the Inter-American context,
where a victim’s right to justice has been expressly identified as part
of the fundamental rights recognized in the American Convention on
Human Rights. 132 According to article 25 of the Convention,
everyone has the right to a judicial recourse “for protection against
acts that violate his fundamental rights” and the States Parties
undertake “to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall
have his rights determined by the competent authority.” 133 Therefore,
even if victims’ individual rights to have offenders prosecuted and
punished is not absolute and is subject to reasonable limitations, the
holders of this right are entitled to a judicial recourse to ensure the
decision to not prosecute does not unreasonably infringe on their
right to justice. In other words, the victims aggrieved by the official
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 14, June 1, 2010, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (“the enjoyment
of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without
discrimination.”).
131. See Luc Côté, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in
International Criminal Law, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 162, 172 (2005) (stating the
importance of established and public guidelines governing the system of judicial
recourse).
132. However, as noted above, if this right is finally recognized by the
Committee on Human Rights, this limit will apply universally.
133. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 25.
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decision to forego prosecution of certain cases or defendants must
have the opportunity to challenge that decision before a judge. If the
judge finds that the prosecutor has exceeded his or her discretion, the
decision to not prosecute should be overturned and the case must go
forward.
In practice, this represents an important check on prosecutors’
discretionary powers because they do not have the last word on
whether a case must be prosecuted or not. Admittedly, this limitation
impairs the effectiveness of prosecutorial discretion as a tool to
control backlogs and to obtain inside evidence. Subjecting
prosecutors’ actions to judicial review increases the workloads on
courts and may also discourage offenders from collaborating with the
prosecution. 134 Nevertheless, its benefits are considerably superior. It
is the only effective way to guarantee that prosecutorial discretion is
applied within its strict limits, and that deterrence and victims’ rights
are not illegitimately restricted. Additionally, it requires prosecutors
to remain accountable to victims and society about their decisions to
not prosecute specific cases, which in turn reinforces their
democratic legitimacy. 135
The second procedural limit is the requirement that the
circumstances and criteria for exercising prosecutorial discretion be
established by law. 136 This is also a consequence of acknowledging
that a decision not to prosecute certain cases implies a limitation to
the victims’ right to justice. Like any fundamental right, limitations
to the right to justice are justified only if they are prescribed by law,
pursue a legitimate end, and are necessary in a democratic society. 137
134. Claudia Angermaier, Essential Qualities of Prioritization Criteria: Clarity
and Precision; Public Access; Non-Political and Confidence-Generating
Formulations; Equal and Transparent Application; and Effective Enforcement, in
CRITERIA FOR PRIORITIZING AND SELECTING CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES CASES
201, 202 (Morten Bergsmo ed., 2d ed. 2010).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 204 (quoting the Recommendations of the Council of Europe on the
Role of the Public Prosecution in the Criminal Justice System).
137. This general principle is established in article 29(2) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights: “In the exercise of his rights and freedoms,
everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms
of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the
general welfare in a democratic society.” G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights art. 29(2) (Dec. 10, 1948).
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In the Inter-American context, the expression “law” has been
interpreted as an act adopted by the legislative branch, in
theunderstanding that this requirement is one of the most important
guarantees against arbitrary restrictions to fundamental rights. 138 The
underlying justification is that the legislative procedure “not only
clothes [the acts limiting basic rights] with the assent of the people
through its representative, but also allows minority groups to express
their disagreement, propose different initiatives, participate in the
shaping of the political will, or influence public opinion so as to
prevent the majority from acting arbitrarily.” 139
A democratic debate of this kind is particularly desirable in
relation to the way States should address human rights abuses.
Although it is clear that States have the duty to investigate and
prosecute these crimes, international law does not―and
cannot―provide bright line rules about how this obligation must be
discharged. 140 States have a margin of appreciation to adopt the
measures that, in their particular situation, better satisfy the
international obligation. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is
perhaps the clearest example of this. As explained above,
international law only provides some guidelines to determine
whether its use is valid in a particular case, but defers to State
authorities the decision of when to use it. This decision involves
complex policy and moral issues, on which reasonable persons may
disagree. May prosecutors give up prosecution of any crime? May
prosecutors grant immunity to any offender? These questions should
be considered and decided in first place by the representatives of the
people after a democratic deliberation, rather than by prosecutors.
Regarding the specific circumstances, the Legislature may decide,
for instance, that prosecutors should not forego prosecution of certain
types of crimes or that certain classes of offenders should not benefit
from grants of immunity.
Admittedly, legislative regulations further limit prosecutorial
138. The Word “Laws” in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-6/86, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 6, ¶ 22 (May
9, 1986).
139. Id.
140. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2551 (stating “international
human rights law traditionally has allowed governments substantial discretion to
determine the means they will use to ensure protected rights.”).

GAITAN- FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

1/24/2017 5:05 PM

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

567

discretion’s benefits. Certainly, prosecutors are technically more
qualified to determine when desisting from prosecution in a
particular case will favor the investigation and prosecution of other
crimes. A statutory prohibition to exercise discretion in such case
may represent an obstacle for the pursuing of that goal. Nevertheless,
whatever cost that legislative regulation may have in terms of
efficiency is amply paid back by the democratic legitimacy that it
provides to prosecutorial discretion in the permitted cases.

V. CONCLUSION
The international obligation to investigate and prosecute serious
human rights violations is in tension with the capacity of domestic
judicial system to process extraordinary amounts of cases. As the
case of Argentina shows, when a domestic system is required to
investigate and prosecute all of the crimes committed in a context of
massive violations of human rights, the outcome may be that more
cases remain unsolved and a larger number of offenders goes
unpunished. Indeed, if the system is unable to control the workloads,
it may rapidly become overwhelmed by the number of cases and find
itself incapable of carrying all of the investigations in an efficient
manner. The more time it takes to solve the cases and prosecute
those responsible, the more difficult it becomes to bring them to
justice. Material evidence may be lost, witness may become
unavailable, memories may fade, and defendants may flee or die.
Moreover, if prosecutors are deprived of the power to grant
immunity to obtain insider testimony, it is possible that many cases
will be never solved or prosecutors will find ways to engage in this
practice at the margin of the law.
This practical experience suggests that the international obligation
to investigate and prosecute should not be interpreted as prohibiting
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. A better approach is to
conclude that international law allows States to exercise
prosecutorial discretion in order to overcome structural obstacles in
the investigation and prosecution of serious human rights offenses.
This power may be used to control workloads by foregoing
prosecution of certain cases and to obtain evidence by granting
immunity or leniency to defendants who cooperate with the
prosecution.
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However, international law also poses substantive and procedural
limits to this practice. Prosecutorial discretion may be used only as a
tool to advance in the discharge of the international obligation to
investigate and prosecute, and never as a mechanism to circumvent
that responsibility. Moreover, victims aggrieved by a decision to not
prosecute a case should have the opportunity to challenge that
decision before a judge and States should determine by law the
criteria and circumstances in which prosecutorial discretion may be
applied. When applied within these limits, prosecutorial discretion
contributes to the deterrence of further abuses of human rights and
guarantees victims’ rights to justice, which are the main rationales of
the international obligation to investigate and prosecute serious
human rights violations.
This article is intended to start a new discussion on the transitional
justice field. While classic scholarly works on transitional justice
focused on which responses emerging democratic governments
should undertake regarding past abuses, this article addresses the
practical difficulties that States face when they actually try to
investigate and prosecute massive crimes, the use of prosecutorial
discretion as a tool to deal with those difficulties, and the regulation
of this practice under international law. This analysis may be of use
to those nations determined to seek truth and justice.

